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OBESITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE:
PROTECTION THROUGH A PERCEIVED DISABILITY CLAIM

UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
KAREN

M. KRAMER7 AND ARLENE B. MAYERSON*"

While employment discrimination against fat' people is well documented
by social science, 2 the question whether the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)4 offer protection against this type
of discrimination has rarely been addressed. The 1993 decision Cook v.
Rhode Island, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardationand Hospitals' marked
the first time that a federal appellate court squarely confronted the issue.'

Cook involved a "perceived disability claim," 7 which derives from the third
prong of the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.8 The First Circuit answered the question

* Stanford Law School, J.D. Candidate, 1995 and participant in clinical work at the
Disability Rights, Education, and Defense Fund during 1994. Linda Krieger, Acting Professor
at Stanford Law School and former attorney at the Employment Law Center in San Francisco,
deserves thanks for her valuable comments and insight given to this article.
** Directing Attorney of Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF). One of
the nation's leading experts on disability rights laws, Ms. Mayerson has been a key advisor to
both Congress and the disability community on the major disability rights legislation of the past
decade, including the Americans With Disabilities Act. Ms. Mayerson has devoted her career
exclusively to disability rights practice, and she has written numerous disability rights briefs to
the United States Supreme Court, either as counsel or amicus. Ms. Mayerson teaches disability
rights law at Boalt Hall and Stanford Law Schools.
1. The National Association to Aid Fat Americans (NAAFA) promotes the descriptive term
"fat." This paper frequently uses the term obese, which is defined in note 9 infra. For better
and for worse, "obesity" provides a less ambiguous reference, which proves useful in
maintaining clarity for the purposes of legal discussion. One of the most famous advocates for
fat people, Natalie Allon, herself used the term "obesity," along with "fatness," in her writings.
See, e.g., Natalie Allon, The Stigma of Overweight in Everyday Life, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF OBESITY 130 (Benjamin B. Wolman ed., 1982).
2. See infra notes 171-82 & 195-202.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1985 & 1994 Supp.).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 Supp.).
5. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
6. See Brief of the Equal Opportunity Commission As Amicus Curiae at 1, Cook v. Rhode
Island, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 931093) [hereinafter "EEOC br."] ("The issue in this case-whether, and under what conditions,
obesity is covered by the Rehabilitation Act-has never, to our knowledge been addressed by
a federal appellate court. Since the definition of 'disability' under the Rehabilitation Act is
identical to that under the ADA, the decision in this case will affect the Commissions' enforcement of both the ADA and.., the Rehabilitation Act.").
7. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22. See also infra text accompanying note 15.
8. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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affirmatively, finding that the plaintiff's condition of obesity 9 met this part
of the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act.
Although some state courts have addressed whether state disability laws
protect against obesity discrimination, the results have varied 0 and, in any

event, are not binding on interpretations of federal law. Few of the state
cases have directly addressed analogs to the perceived disability claim under
federal law."
One state court case, Cassista v. Community Foods,

9. As used by the medical and scientific community, and often referred to in law review
articles and cases, "obesity" means weight 20% greater than the ideal as determined by actuarial
tables; "serious" or "gross obesity" means 30-35% over this ideal. Weighing twice the ideal
indicated in these tables classifies as "morbid obesity." See, e.g., Jane Osborne Baker, The
RehabilitationAct of 1973: Protection For Victims of Weight Discrimination? 29 UCLA L.
Rev. 947, 948-49 (1982) (citing Diet Related to Killer Diseases H1: Hearings Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977)). Many
commentators criticize the actuarial tables as a problematic manner for determining an "ideal"
weight. See, e.g., Esther D. Rothblum, Women and Weight: Fadand Fiction, 124 J. PSYCHOL.
5, 7-8 (1990).
10. In sum, New York and New Jersey Courts have ruled that obesity falls within the
meaning of the term disability for the purposes of protection under state human rights laws, and
Michigan's law explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of weight. See State Division of
Human Rights ax rel. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 478 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1984) aff'd 491
N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. 1985) ("gross obesity" is in itself a physical and medical impairment
within the meaning of New York's human rights law); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems,
Inc., 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) (plaintiff's obesity constituted a "real medical"
condition qualifying for protection); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(a) (1992).
Courts declining to extend coverage of obesity under state law include: Greene v. Union
P. R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (morbid obesity not protected because it is not
an immutable condition); Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
699 S.W. 2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiff's obesity plus high blood pressure not covered);
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Human Relations Com., 448 A.2d
701, 707 (Pa. 1982) (morbid obesity alone not a disability); Civil Service Comm'n v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991) (plaintiff's evidence
insufficient to establish obesity as a perceived disability).
11. For example, in two often cited state decisions declining to extend coverage of obesity,
the perceived disability prong had not been adopted by the state legislature at the time the
incident or legal proceedings began; consequently, the appellate courts declined to consider the
viability of a perceived disability claim. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Commonwealth,
Pennsylvania Human Relations Com., 448 A.2d 701, 708 (Pa. 1982); Missouri Comm'n on
Human Rights v. Southwester Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). While
finding obesity protectable, the New Jersey Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff's obesity
qualified as "a real medical or pathological condition," so that the perceived disability claim was
not "critical to our decision." Gimello v. Agency Rent-a-Car Systems, Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 278
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
Apart from Cassista I, discussed infra text accompanying notes 1111-46, only one other
state case has addressed the coverage of obesity under a state law version of the perceived
disability claim. See Civil Service Commission v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that his obesity constituted
a perceived disability claim under state law). Although the Pennsylvania court paid lipservice
to the issue of the perceived disability claim in Civil Service Commission, the analysis failed to
treat the requirements of a perceived disability claim as distinct frorp an actual disability claim.
See 591 A.2d 281, 283-84 (dismissing the claim because of evidence that plaintiff's obesity is
not, in fact, a disabling condition); see generallyRobin Chodak, Recent Decisions: Pennsylvania
Excludes Obesity from Protection under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act-Civil Service
Commission v. Pennsylvania Commission, 591 A.2d 81 (Pa.1991), 65 TEMPLE L. REv. (1992)
(criticizing the Pennsylvania Court for applying the perceived disability analysis more narrowly
to an obesity case than in precedent applying the perceived disability claim to other conditions).
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("CassistaI/')'2 is notable both because it addressed a perceived disability
claim, and it was decided just prior to the First Circuit's decision in Cook;
the California Supreme Court based its opposite holding largely on its
interpretation of the federal laws, which it treated as guiding.13
This article examines the recent holdings in Cook and Cassista II for
discussion about the appropriateness of the coverage of obesity discrimination under federal disability legislation, focusing on the perceived disability
claim. In both Cassista 1H and Cook, the plaintiffs did not consider
themselves "disabled" or limited in their capacity to perform any of the job
functions, 4 making the perceived disability claim under federal law
especially relevant to their cases." As the First Circuit in Cook noted,
"few 'perceived disability' cases have been litigated and, consequently,
decisional law involving the interplay of perceived disabilities and section
504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] is hen's-teeth rare. "16
Part I of this article will outline in detail the provisions in the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disability Act establishing the parameters of a
perceived disability claim. After providing this background, Part II will
discuss the holdings in Cook and Cassista HI. This section will highlight
important aspects of the Cook precedent for claims of employment discrimination based on obesity and suggest that the court's treatment of the
perceived disability claim was appropriate. In contrast, it will be argued, the
holding in Cassista II added more stringent requirements to the perceived
disability claim, to the extent that the opinion was based on interpretation of
federal law. Finally, Part III will examine the body of literature and
scientific data on the stigmatization of obesity in modem America, using this
information to further show how prejudice toward obesity in many cases
constitutes exactly the type of barrier to employment that the perceived
disability claim was designed to combat.

12. 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
13. Id. at 1149-50 (noting that the original California Code Provision on disability
discrimination derives from the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the 1992 amendment to
the state code is "modeled, in turn, on the ADA").
14. See Cook, 10 F.3d at 22 (plaintiff posited that she was "fully able" although the
defendant regarded her as "physically impaired"); Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (Ct. App. 1992) [hereinafter "Cassista I"] (plaintiff "vigorously denies being
physically handicapped," and claims that defendant "consideredher weight to be a handicap.")
(emphasis added).
15. Under the perceived disability claim, plaintiffs need not insist that they are actually
disabled, which is an important factor, given the reluctance of many people who are obese to
define themselves as "physically disabled." See Allon, supra note 1, at 145.
16. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22.
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I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES: THE
PARAMETERS OF A PERCEIVED DISABILITY CLAIM UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

A. The Three-ProngDefinition of Disability
A perceived disability claim derives from the third of the three-prong
definition of disability set forth in the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. As codified 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B), the Rehabilitation
Act defines the term "individual with a disability" 17 to mean any person
who "i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, ii) has a record of such
impairment, or iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."'"8 The ADA
uses the same definition in 42 U.S.C. §12102(2).' 9 In fact, because Congress modeled the ADA after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA not
uses only the same definition of disability, but also adopts the same definition
of the "regarded as" prong provided by the Rehabilitation Act regulations.20

17. The amendment to the Rehabilitation Act appearing in the 1993 Supplement changed the
previously used word "handicap" to "disability," the term used in the ADA. The ADA adopted
the term "disability" to bring the law "in line with the sensibilities of most Americans with
Disabilities" and advocates of people with disabilities. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND HUMAN RESOURCES, S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989). Accordingly,
this note will use the term disability, except when quoting older statutes and case law.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994 Supp.). The same definition was used in the 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (1988), except the word "handicap" was used instead of disability, as explained
supra note 17.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994 Supp.).
20. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, S. REP. No. 116, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989) (stating that the definition of the term "disabity" included in the
ADA bill is comparable to the definition of the term "individual with handicaps" in the
Rehabilitation Act, and the same analysis should apply); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
H.R. REP. No. 485 (I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990) (noting that the ADA uses the same
'regarded as test" as the Rehabilitation Act guidelines); Overview of the Regulations, 56 Fed.
Reg. 35726 (1991) (explaining that the format of the ADA guidelines reflect "congressional
intent, as expressed in legislative history, that the regulations implementing the employment
provisions of the ADA be modeled on the regulations implementing Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended.").
Notwithstanding the identical definitions of disability, one of the main differences between
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is that the latter extended coverage to private entities that
do not receive federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994 Supp.); 29 U.S.C. § 793 et seq.
(1985 & 1994 Supp.).
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B. Prong-ThreeAnalysis: The PerceivedDisability Claim
1. Three Types of Perceived Disability Claims
The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act set forth three
methods of meeting the "regarded as" prong,2" which is known as the
"perceived disability claim," and the same test has been incorporated into the
regulations implementing the ADA.' The "perceived disability claim" can
be satisfied three different ways, by showing that an individual:
1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a [covered entity] as
constituting such limitation; [or]
2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such an impairment; or
3) Has none of the impairments defined in [the paragraphs defining
"physical or mental impairment"] but is treated by a [covered entity]
as having [such an/a substantially limiting] impairment.'
The wording, except where marked by brackets, is exactly the same in the
regulations implementing the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, aside from
insignificant variations in punctuation.
The term "physical or mental impairment" used above is also defined by
regulations implementing both statutes. Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, "physical and mental impairment" means:
1)Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following bodily
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic, and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or

21. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1993) (Department of Health and Human Services
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(iv) (1994)
(Department of Education regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1994).
23. The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act say "such an impairment." The
ADA regulations changed this to "a substantially limiting impairment" in order to clarify that
the third part of the perceived disability test "refers to any substantially limiting impairment,
rather than just to one of the impairments described in §§ 1630.2(1)(1) or (2)." See Section-bySection Analysis of Comments and Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35728 (1991).
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2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional, or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.'
The Rehabilitation Act regulations also clarify that these provisions "clearly
comprehend" the inclusion of "any condition which is mental or physical but
whose precise nature is not . . . known."'

Under the third method of

satisfying the perceived disability claim, an individual need not have an
actual physical or mental impairment. Consequently, the issue whether a
person's obesity qualifies as a cognizable impairment is not essential to one
type of perceived disability claim, in contrast to prong-one analysis of
disability, which in all cases requires that the plaintiff has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits major life activities.
The interpretive guidelines to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA make
clear that the perceived disability claim was meant to open up an alternative
to claims based on the first two prongs. The ADA regulations offer more
elaborate commentary than the Rehabilitation Act regulations, but the latter
will first be noted. While the ADA and Rehabilitation Act regulations are
consistent, the ADA sought to be more comprehensive in order to be easily
understood.'
The Rehabilitation Act guidelines comment that the perceived disability
claim includes three types of claims beyond those that would satisfy the first
two prongs of the definition of disability in § 706(8)(B). First, the perceived
disability claim includes many persons who are ordinarily considered to be
disabled, but who "do not technically fall within the first two parts of the
The example given for this is a person with a
statutory definition."'
8
limp. Second, the statute includes persons who might not ordinarily be
considered disabled, such as a persons with disfiguring scars. 9 Third the
perceived disability claim covers persons who "have no physical or mental

24. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(h)(2) (1994) (ADA regulations); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3
(j)(2)(i)(A)-(j)(2)(i)(B) (1994) (Rehabilitation Act Regulations); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i)(A)(j)(2)(i)(B) (1993) (Rehabilitation Act Regulations).
25. 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A, at 373 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.30)); 45 C.F.R.

pt. 84, app. A., at 370 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)). The guidelines note that a third

clause once stated this explicitly, but it was removed because it was considered duplicative.
26. See Overview of the Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35726 (1991). Consequently, while
adopting the same definitions as the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA also defined some terms
previously not defined, such as "substantially limits" and "reasonable accommodation." Id.
27. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 371 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)); 34 C.F.R.
pt. 104, app. A, at 373 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.30)).
28. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 371 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)); 34 C.F.R.
pt. 104, app. A, at 373 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.30)).
29. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 371 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)); 34 C.F.R.
pt. 104, app. A, at 373 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.30)).
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impairment" but are "treated" by the employer "as if" they were disabled; 30
the Rehabilitation Act guidelines give no example for this point.
The EEOC's interpretative guidelines to the ADA provide these and
additional examples that would qualify under the three types of perceived
disability claims. Under the first type, the regulations give the example of an
employee with controlled high blood pressure; if an employer reassigns the
employee to less strenuous work out of unsubstantiated fears that the person
will suffer a heart attack, the reassignment would meet the definition of the
first type of perceived disability claim." For the second type, an individual
who has an impairment that is only substantially limiting because of the
attitude of others toward it, the regulations give the examples of a facial scar,
disfigurement, or involuntary jerk."
For the third definition of the
perceived disability claim, the regulations give the example of an employer
who erroneously believes that an employee is infected with the HIV virus. 3
The legislative history of the ADA repeatedly provides two further
examples of perceived impairments covered under the "regarded as" prong:
burn victims34 and people who, while lacking symptoms of impairment,
show abnormal x-rays." The ADA guidelines cite burn victims as an example of protected conditions under the "regarded as" prong in Title I of
the ADA;36 since the same definition of disability applies to Title I and
Title I, no reason exists why bum victims would not also be recognized in
the context of employment.
As these guidelines make evident, an individual need not possess an
actual physical or mental impairment to seek coverage under the law. The
"regarded as" prong turns significantly on the employer's perception.3
Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act, as interpreted by the regulations
promulgated by the Departments of Health and Human Services and Education, specifically rejected a limitation of the law's application to " 'tradi-

30.45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 371 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)) (emphasis
added); 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A, at 373 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)) (emphasis
added).
31. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A, at 398 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(1)).

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485(1),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485 (M), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990).
35. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989) (citing Thornhill v.
Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989)); H.R. REP. No. 485 (I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1990) (same).
36. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36.104 app. B, at 583 (1993) (clarifying 28 C.F.R. § 36.104) ("These
persons would be covered under this test [the "regarded as" prong] based on attitudes of others
towards the impairment, even if they did not view themselves as 'impaired'."). Title mE
addresses Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities, while Title I
governs employment.
37. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 485 (pl), 101st Cong., 2 Sess.
30 (1990) ("The perception of the covered entity is a key element to this test").
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tional' handicaps." 3" Suggestion by some commentators that the Rehabilitation Act does not protect obesity because it covers only those persons who
are "severely handicapped" and in "need of rehabilitation," is plainly illfounded. 9
2. The Rationale: Arline and the Protection Against
"Myths, Fears, and Stereotypes"
As the EEOC's interpretive guidelines to the ADA discuss,' the
Supreme Court decision, School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,"
articulates the rationale for the perceived disability claim. Initially, Arline
raised the question whether a person with a contagious disease qualified as
an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court held
that "[s]uch an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental
capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to
work as result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment. 42 The
Court further ruled that by establishing the perceived disability claim,
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
as are the physical limitations that
disability and disease are as handicapping
43
flow from actual impairment.
The EEOC's interpretive guidance to the ADA recites these Arline
holdings and restates that "an individual rejected from a job because of the
'myths, fears, and stereotypes' associated with disabilities would be covered"
under the "regarded as" provision.' The interpretive guide makes explicit
that such coverage exists "whether or not" an individual's "mental or
physical impairment would be considered a disability under the first or
second part of the definition of disability." 45
The EEOC guidelines then note "common attitudinal barriers" identified
by sociologists that frequently result in exclusion by employers of persons
with disabilities; these include "concerns regarding productivity, safety,

38. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 370 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)) (the
Department believes it has "no flexibility within the statutory definition to limit the term to
persons who have those severe, permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly
regarded as handicaps"); 34 C.F.R., pt. 104, app. A, at 372 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. §

104.3G)) (same).
39. See Bruce I. Shapiro The Heavy Burden of Establishing Weight as a Handicap Under
Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 18 W. ST. L. REv. 565, 569 (1991); Donald L. Bierman,

Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity Be a Protected
Classification?30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 951, 968 (1990).
40. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 398 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)).
41. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
42. Id. at 283.
43. Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
44. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 398 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)).

45. Id.
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insurance, liability, attendance . . . [and] workers compensation costs."' 46

The guidelines conclude:
[If an individual can show that a [covered entity] made an employment
decision because of a perception of disability based on "myth, fear, or
stereotype," the individual will satisfy the "regarded as" part of the
definition of disability. If the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, an inference that the
4
employer
is acting on the basis of "myth, fear, or stereotype" may
arise.
Through this decree, the guidelines explicitly command an examination of
whether societal prejudices associated with disability has impermissibly
played a role in an employer's decision.
C. The "SubstantiallyLimited" in a "MajorLife Activity" Provision
The "substantially limits" provision, although it requires explanation
here, would more likely pose difficulty for a claim of obesity discrimination
under the prong-one definition of disability than under the "regarded as"
prong. As the legislative history emphasizes, the perceived disability claim
is "particularly important for individuals with stigmatic conditions that are
viewed as physical impairments but do not in fact result in a substantial
limitation of a major life activity."48 It suffices to show that the employer
has treated the plaintiff's obesity as if it were an impairment substantially
limiting a major life activity.
The regulations for the Rehabilitation Act define "major life activity" to
include walking, breathing, performing manual tasks, and working, 49 a
definition that has been incorporated into the ADA regulations.5" The ADA
regulations for the first time defined "substantially limits," 5 although the
term is still not currently defined in the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act. 2
The ADA regulations describe "substantially limiting" as an impairment
that renders an individual "[u]nable to perform a major life activity.

. ."

or,

46. The guidelines also specifically noted the cost of accommodation and accessibility as
impermissible attitudinal barriers. Because this article focuses on perceived disability claims,
where the plaintiff has indicated no need for accommodation or improved access, those factors
are less relevant to the current discussion. However, those factors might be relevant to the
situation where an obese plaintiff has proceeded under a prong one claim.
47. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 398 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)).
48. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989).
49. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (1993); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1994).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1994).

51. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1994).
52. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 370 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30))
(Department does not believe that the definition of "substantially limits" is possible at this time);
34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A, at 372 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.30)) (same).
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alternatively, that "[s]ignificantly restrict[s] . the condition, manner, or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to . . . the average person in

. .

. general. . .

.,"3

The regulations note that "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short
duration, with little or no long-term impact" such as broken limbs, sprained
joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza are usually not disabilities. 4
The guidelines then say, "Similarly, except in rare circumstances, obesity is
not considered a disabling impairment." 55 The EEOC clarified in an amicus
brief in Cook v. Rhode Island that this notation poses no absolute bar against
coverage of obesity discrimination under the ADA, especially not for
"morbid obesity," which is a "'rare, chronic condition."5 6 Regardless of
whether obesity is actually substantially limiting, the perceived disability
claim mandates inquiry into whether the employer has treated a person as if
his or her obesity is a substantially limiting impairment.
An employer who refuses to hire a person because of obesity may be
deemed to have treated that individual as substantially limited in the major
life activity of working because of a perceived impairment.5 7 While the
Rehabilitation Act guidelines remain silent on further explanation, the ADA
guidelines comment that only when an individual is not substantially limited
with respect to any other major life activity, should the individual's ability
to perform the major life activity of "working" be considered. 8 Showing
that an employer considered the individual substantially limited in the major
life activity of working because of an actual or assumed impairment would
appear to satisfy the first and third types of perceived disability claims.
Additionally, as the Arline decision noted, an individual might be "sub53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1994). According to the EEOC regulations, the factors that
courts should consider are: 1) nature and severity of the impairment, 2) the duration or expected

duration of the impairment, and 3) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of, or resulting from, the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2)

(1994).
54. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A, at 396 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)).
55. Id.
56. See EEOC br., supra note 6, at 13, 11 n.4.
57. The ADA regulations alone currently define factors that may be used in making the
determination whether an individual is substantially limited in working. These factors include:
1) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
2) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
3) The job for which the individual has been disqualified because of the impairment,
and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills, or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3) (1994).
58. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 397 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)).
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stantially limit[ed]" in his or her "ability to work as result of the negative
reactions of others to the impairment,"59 which seems to correlate with the
second type of perceived disability claim.
The interpretive guidelines to the ADA demarcates two boundaries for
determining when rejection or dismissal from a job in a particular instance
satisfies showing substantial limitation in the major life activity of "working":
[on the other hand] [A]n individual is not substantially limited in working
just because he or she is unable to perform a particular job for one
employer, or because he or he is unable to perform a specialized job or
profession requiring extraordinary skill, prowess, or talent....
On the other hand .... [a]n individual is substantially limited in
working if the individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, when compared
with the ability of the average person with comparable qualifications to
perform those same jobs.'

The ADA guidelines further clarify that § 1630.2(j) is "not intended to
require an onerous evidentiary showing" by the plaintiff.6
D. Specifically Excluded Claims of a "PerceivedDisability"
While the "regarded as" prong affords coverage to a potentially broad
scope of disability claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the
statutes and the interpretive guides do set forth some specific exclusions.
The following characteristics cannot be treated as a "disability," and
therefore cannot be covered under a perceived disability claim: transvestitism; transsexualism; pedophilia, exhibitionism; voyeurism; gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior
disorders; compulsive gambling; kleptomania; pyromania; psychoactive
substance use disorders resulting from current or illegal use of drugs; and
homosexuality and bisexuality.62
The ADA guidelines add that environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a prison record are not
impairments.63 While obesity certainly has dimensions of a cultural
impairment-as does societal prejudice against all disabilities-obesity is also
a physical condition that may affect, or be presumed to affect, the bodily
systems.

59. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
60. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 397 (1994) (clarifying C.F.R. § 1630.20)).
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)-12211(b) (1990) (ADA statutory provision); 29 U.S.C. §
706(7)(E)-(7)(F)(1993 Supp.) (Rehabilitation Act statutory provision).
63. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 396 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2()).
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Other than these enumerated exclusions and limitations, the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act leave open a variety of perceived disability claims. The
interpretive guidelines to both acts make clear that the regulations avoided
setting forth a specific list of diseases and conditions that could qualify as
covered impairments, because of the "difficulty in ensuring comprehensiveness of any such list. "I Consequently, it cannot be argued that the laws
preclude coverage of obesity simply because the guidelines fail to enumerate
it as a cognizable impairment. Moreover, in a number of respects the
regulations explicitly invite a case by case determination;65 therefore recognizing obesity as protectable under the federal disability laws cannot necessarily be characterized as unwarranted judicial activism.6'
II. RECENT DECISIONS ON THE COVERAGE OF OBESITY DISCRIMINATION
UNDER FEDERAL LAW: THE COOK PRECEDENT AND THE MISGUIDED
RATIONALE OF CASSISTA II

This section analyzes two recent holdings that address the issue of the
coverage of obesity under federal law. Part A discusses Cook v. Department
of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals,67 the first decision by a
federal circuit court to address the coverage of obesity under the Rehabilitation Act and to do so specifically applying prong-three analysis. The
discussion will highlight key aspects and implications of the Cook decision,
a significant precedent which upheld the plaintiff's perceived disability claim.
Part B discusses Cassistav. Community Foods, ("CassistaIT")6 a California Supreme Court decision which, whtle not binding on federal courts,
based its decision largely on its interpretation of the federal law. The
analysis discusses how the California Supreme Court decision actually
misinterprets the requirements for protection under federal disability law and
how the final ruling in Cook rejects linchpins of the analysis in Cassista.
64. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 370 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)); 34 C.F.R.
pt. 104, app. A, at 372 (1994) (clarifying 34 C.F.R. § 104.30)); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,

app., at 395 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)) (The ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, does "not attempt a 'laundry list' of impairments that are 'disabilities'"). While this
language refers to "prong-one" claims, if a claim in not barred under "prong-one," it is even
less likely to be barred under a "prong-three" claim, as the requirements of "prong-three" are
less exacting.
65. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 396 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.0))
(holding that the determination of whether an individual is "substantially limited in a major life
activity," pursuant to prong-one analysis, must be made on a "case-by-case basis"); id. (holding
that the determination of whether an idivdual has a disability under prong-one analysis is "not
necessary based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment," but rather on the "effect" it has
on a person); cf. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (holding
that the "individualized assessment" is required in determining whether a person is otherwise
qualified under a perceived disability claim). Indeed, individualized, case-specific analysis is
a touchstone for all disability cases.
66. Contra Shapiro, supra note 39, at 577.
67. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
68. 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
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A. The Holding in Cook
Cook involved a plaintiff who was denied the position of institutional
attendant at defendant's facility for people with mental retardation in 1988.
When plaintiff Bonnie Cook applied for the position, she stood 5'2" and
weighed over 320 pounds; her weight classified her as "morbidly obese." 69
Previously she had worked at the facility as an attendant from 1978 to 1980,
and again from 1981 to 1986, both times departing voluntarily and leaving
behind a "spotless work record." '7 In fact, the defendant conceded that
Cook's previous performance met its legitimate expectations. 7 When she
worked at the facility previously, at times she weighed almost as much as she
weighed when she reapplied in 1988.' During the routine pre-hire physical
in 1988, the nurse employed by the defendant determined that the plaintiff
met the classification of morbid obesity, but found "no limitations that
impinged on her ability to do the job."
Nevertheless, the defendant refused to hire Cook, offering two reasons:
First, defendant claimed that Cook's morbid obesity compromised her ability
to evacuate patients in case of an emergency; and second, defendant
concluded that morbid obesity put her at greater risk of developing serious
ailments, which would promote absenteeism and increase the likelihood of
workers' compensation claims.74
After trial, a jury found, inter alia, that Cook, apart from her disability
or perceived disability, was "qualified to perform the duties" of the position
and that "the defendant did not reasonably believe plaintiff lacked such
qualifications." 75 The jury awarded her $100,000 in compensatory
damages 76 for 'a"failure to hire"'77 claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

69. Cook, 10 F.3d at 20.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 27 n. 12.
73. Id. at 20-21.

74. Id. at 21; see also id. at 28 n.13 (Doctor testified that he declined to give medical

clearance to hire the plaintiff for three reasons: First, he believed that she herself was at risk
because of her obesity; second, he believed that she could put the retarded residents at risk in
emergency situations; and third, he was concerned about the overall costs of Worker's
Compensation injuries).
75. Id. at 21 n.3. The jury indicated these findings through interrogatories answered
favorably for the plaintiff. Id. at 21.
76. Id.at 21.
77. To invoke the Rehabilitation Act in a failure-to-hire claim, plaintiff must prove four
things: 1) that she applied for a post in a federally funded program or activity; 2) that, at the
time, she suffered from a cognizable disability; 3) but was, nonetheless, qualified for the
position, and 4)that she was not hired due solely to her disability. Id. at 22.
Although not summarized in the opinion, inquiry into whether the plaintiff is "qualified"
means determining whether she is able to perform "essential functions" of the position with
"reasonable accommodation." See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k) (1994); see also Pub. L. 101336 Tit. I § 101(8) (using the same standard in the ADA).
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The defendant's promptly appealed" for review of plaintiff's "perceived disability"79 claim. As a result of uncontested trial instructions, the
appellate court considered only whether plaintiff met the first and third types
The court noted that the second
of perceived disability claims.
type-showing that a plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as the result of others' attitudes-arguably fell
within the scope of plaintiff's claim, but the court did not examine the matter
further, as plaintiff had not cross-appealed that issue.' °
The court explained that to satisfy the first type of perceived disability
claim, Cook needed to show that, while she had a physical or mental
impairment, it did not substantially limit her ability to perform major life
activities." Providing the third type of perceived disability claim required
showing that, though "she did not suffer at all from a statutorily prescribed
physical or mental impairment," the defendant "treated her impairment
(whether actual or perceived) as substantially limiting" one or more major
life activities.' Because the jury had returned no special finding as to
whether plaintiff "actually had a cognizable impairment or was merely
regarded" by the defendant as having one, and the jury had received
instructions in the alternative, Cook was entitled to prevail on either of those
theories.'

While ruling that the record "comfortably justifie[d]" either of those
theories,' the court rejected two main arguments asserted by the defendant:
First, that "mutable" conditions are not impairments covered under the
Rehabilitation Act;' and second, because plaintiff's conduct is "caused or
at least exacerbated by voluntary conduct," it cannot qualify as an impairment covered under the Rehabilitation Act. 6 Because of the significance
of those holdings, the court's discussion will now be highlighted in some
depth.
Explicitly, the First Circuit rejected the defendant's suggestion that
immutability constitutes a requirement for protection of a condition, whether
actual or perceived. The court noted that "Mutability is nowhere mentioned
in the statute or regulations, and we see little reason to postulate it is an
Accepting the
automatic disqualifier under [the Rehabilitation Act]." '

Id.

78. Cook, 10 F.3d at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 22.
81. Id. at 23 (interpreting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(A)).
82. Id. (interpreting 45 C.F.R. § 84.30j)(2)(iv)(C)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 24. The opinion stated that such assertion "rests on a legally faulty premise."
87. Id.at 24 n.7.
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position of the EEOC in an amicus brief,"8 the First Circuit ruled that the
only relevance mutability bears on a claim is in determining the substantiality
of the limitation flowing from a given impairment: "[s]o viewed, mutability
only precludes [from coverage] those conditions that an individual can easily
and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration."8 9 The court strongly
suggested that it considered the lower court's instruction to the jury that a
"'condition or impairment is not an impairment unless it... constitutes an
immutable condition that the person affected is powerless to control"' to be
erroneous. 90 However, those district court's jury instruction became "the
law of this case" and was harmless in that it worked to this plaintiff's advantage, since Cook was able to satisfy the charge as a matter of fact. 9

The court further stated that "[e]ven if immutability were normally a
prerequisite to finding a covered impairment," the "logic of a perceived
disability claim . . . would nonetheless defeat" the application of such
requirement. 2 So long as an employer regards the condition as immutable,

no more is needed.93 The court determined that the facts satisfied such a
jury finding, because the testimony showed that the defendant regarded
plaintiff's obesity as "'an impairment of a continuing nature." 94
With equal force, the court rejected defendant-appellant's assertion that

a condition caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct cannot qualify as an
impairment covered under the Rehabilitation Act.95 The court explained:
The Rehabilitation Act contains no language suggesting that its protection
is linked to how an individual became impaired, or whether an individual
contributed to his or her impairment. On the contrary, the Act indisputably applies to numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by
voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting

88. EEOC br., supra note 6, at 17.
89. Cook, 10 F.3d at 24 n.7.
90. Id. at 24.
91. Id. at 24 n.7. In this case the plaintiff presented "credible evidence" that metabolic
dysfunction lingers even after weight loss in a person who is morbidly obese; a jury could have
reasonably found that while "people afflicted with morbid obesity can treat manifestations of
metabolic dysfunction by fasting or perennial undereating, the physical impairment itself-a
dysfunctional metabolism-is permanent." Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 24 (interpreting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(C)).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Evans v. Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir. 1988)). The defendantappellant's own expert witness testified that it is dangerous for a dieter to lose more than 20%
of her total body weight each year, and the defendant's doctor who denied medical clearance of
plaintiff acknowledged that he would have rehired Cook only when she reduced her weight to
190 pounds. Id. at n.8. Taking these testimonies together, the jury could reasonably have concluded that, "appellant treated plaintiff as if her obesity would have disqualified her from
working for over two years." Id. The court considered two years a period sufficient to
establish a perception of an impairment of a continuing nature, hence satisfying whatever import
immutability could be said to bear on the "regarded as" prong. Id. at 24.
95. Id. (stating that appellant's assertion rests on a "legally faulty premise").
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from cigarette smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various
types, and the like.'

The court added that while the defendant's proposition was faulty as a matter97
of law, the plaintiff was able, in this case, to satisfy it as a matter of fact.
In firmly rejecting mutability and voluntariness as the touchstones of
protection for disability claims under federal law, the First Circuit established
an important precedent, 9 one consistent with modern sensitivities toward
the issue of disability. This ruling comports with the understanding that the
way an individual has become a "person with a disability" is considered a
private and otherwise irrelevant matter. 99 Legislative history to the ADA
further evidences Congress' intent that the genesis of a disability be
considered irrelevant. 100
In addition to addressing the issues of mutability and voluntariness, the
First Circuit set forth a number of other principles important to obesity
discrimination claims by other plaintiffs. These included: 1) how obesity
may easily satisfy the meaning of the term "physical or mental impairment;"'' 2) how the requirement that the employer treat the plaintiff as
substantially limited in "major life activities," can be satisfied, including; 3)
how an employer's rejection for a single position entailing skills that apply
to a broad class of jobs may show that the employer regarded the plaintiff as
"substantially limited" in the major life activity of "working." Each of these
rulings will be highlighted in turn.

96. Id. (citing as examples, Severino v. North Ft. Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179,
1182 (11th Cir. 1991) (AIDS); Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 517
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992) (drug abuse); Gallagher v. Catto, 778 F.Supp
570, 577 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (alcoholism); 45 C.F.R. § 84,
app. A, at 377 (1993) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j))(cancer; heart disease)).
97. Id. The court described how, "[g]iven the plethoric evidence introduced concerning the
physiological roots of morbid obesity, the jury certainly could have concluded that the metabolic
dysfunction and failed appetite-suppressing neural signals were beyond plaintiff's control and
rendered her effectively powerless to manage her weight." Id.
98. Notably, the decision can be understood as rejecting the holding Greene v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981) in the context of federal disability law. See also
Terry S. Hyman, Voluntary Handicaps-Should Drug Abuse, Alcoholism, and Obesity be
Protected by Pennsylvania'sAnti-DiscriminationLaws? 85 DICK. L. REV. 475 (1981) (arguing
that the treatment of obesity, alcoholism, and drug abuse as disabilities in related areas of the
law shows that the issue of voluntariness is insufficient to justify exclusion under the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act).
99. For example, an etiquette guide for positive interactions with people with disabilities
states, "Do not ask a person when or how they [sic] became disabled. You do not ask people
of other minorities when they became Jewish, Black, or Hispanic. When and how a person
became disabled is irrelevant." CHARLES D. GOLDMAN, DISABILITY RIGHTS GUIDE 17-18 (2d
ed. 1991). Based on this principle, in filing complaints on behalf of persons with disabilities,
the Disabilities, Rights, Education, and Defense Fund (DREDF) never describes how it is that
the person became, for example, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair or a person who has an
amputated leg and uses a prosthetic.
100. See H.R. REI'. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990) ("The cause of a disability
is always irrelevant to the determination of a disability.").
101. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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First, the court found that plaintiff satisfied with ease the requirement
that her obesity constitutes an actual or perceived "physical impairment" as
contemplated by the Rehabilitation Act. Preliminarily, the First Circuit noted
that the regulations "broadly"" ° define the term "physical or mental
impairment." The court then explained how the record amply satisfies a
finding of an actual or perceived physical impairment, pursuant to the first
and third types of perceived disability claims. On the one hand, the jury
could have found that the plaintiff did have a statutorily recognized physical
impairment, in light of the expert testimony that "morbid obesity is a
physiological disorder involving a dysfunction of a both the metabolic system
and the neurological appetite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing
adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular
systems." 103 On the other hand, the court noted, evidence also "conclusively" showed that the defendant treated Cook's obesity "as if actually
affected her musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems": the evidence
included the defendant's proffered concern that Cook's limited mobility
impeded her ability to evacuate patients, and the defendant expressed fear
about her increased risk of heart disease and the concomitant rise of worker's
compensation costs. "4
Notably, this interpretation of the term "physical or mental impairment"
in the context of a perceived disability claim could apply to many plaintiffs
who are obese, even if their weight falls short of "morbid obesity." This
flexible ruling comports with the directives to avoid easy labels0 5 and to
engage in fact-specific, "individualized inquiry."'

This ruling reaches

potentially a large number of cases, including the facts of Cassista, which
will be discussed next.
Second, the court ruled that the plaintiff satisfied the required showing
that the defendant treated her as "substantially limited" in major life
activities. Showing that the employer's perception that obesity interferes
with the applicant's ability to undertake "physical activities" such as
"walking, lifting, bending, stooping, and kneeling" can, alone, satisfy this
requirement. 0 7 Third, and relatedly, the court added that the "substantially
limited in working" provision in a perceived disability claim can be satisfied
102. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22.
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id.
105. As the ADA guidelines note:
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based
on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather, the effect of
the impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for
particular individuals but not for others .... Other impairments, however, such as
HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 396 (1994) (emphasis added) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)).
106. See, e.g., School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
107. Cook, 10 F.3d at 25.
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where the employer "den[ies] an applicant even a single job that requires no
unique physical skills, due solely to the perception that the applicant suffers
from a physical limitation that would keep her from qualifying for a broad
spectrum of jobs."' 8
The First Circuit's interpretation of the "substantially limited in
working" provision fits within the boundaries established by the interpretive
guidelines of the ADA. These guidelines say, on the one hand, that rejection
from a single job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the ability to
work; on the other hand, it is not meant for the plaintiff to make onerous
evidentiary showings, and a job rejection that would apply to a broad "class
of jobs" would be sufficient to meet the substantially limited in working requirement. 109
In summary, the Cook decision issued a number of rulings favorable to
a plaintiff who proceeds with a perceived disability claim for discrimination
on the basis of his or her obesity. Because this is the first case by a federal
circuit court to address the issue squarely, Cook represents the leading case
to date. Some of the court's rulings may also benefit plaintiff's proceeding
with a disability claim not only under a perceived disability claim, but also
under prong-one analysis."' These beneficial rulings include the court's
finding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that she had an
actual physical or mental impairment as defined by the statute, and that
rejection from a single job involving no special skills may show that a person
is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
B. The Holding in Cassista II
CassistaII involved a plaintiff who applied twice for a position at the
defendant's health food store. In 1987 the store had three vacant positions,
which required the employee to perform duties such as running the register,
stocking 50-pound bags of grain, carrying 50-pound boxes, retrieving
groceries from the warehouse, changing 55-gallon jugs, and carrying large
creates of milk."' After her application passed screening, Toni Linda
Cassista was interviewed by a hiring committee, which lasted approximately
thirty minutes and covered topics such as her employment history and the job

108. Id. at 26.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
110. Under prong-one analysis it would be theoretically possible for an obese plaintiff to
request "reasonable accommodations" such as larger furniture. So far no cases at the state or
federal level have involved requests for any accommodation from employers, indicating that the
specter of requests for reasonable accommodation claims by obese people may be unlikely. In
many cases besides Cook and Cassista II, the plaintiffs who are obese do not consider
themselves in need of any policy modifications. See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Human Relations Com., 448 A.2d 701, 707 (1982); Krein v.
Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W. 2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987).
111. Cassista I,856 P.2d at 1144.
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requirements. 112 Previously, Cassista had been employed in several restaurants, managed a sandwich shop, and worked as an aid in a nursing
home. "

At the time she applied for a position with defendant's health food store,
she stood 5'4" tall and weighed 305 pounds. 14 When asked during the
interview whether "she had any physical limitations that would interfere with
her ability to do the job," she said that she "did not."115 Customarily,
Community Foods used a 200-hour probationary period to determine whether
a new employee could perform the duties required. 6
Despite being told that the hiring committee would notify her, she was
never contacted, and subsequently learned that three others had been
chosen." 7 Shortly after, when she learned of another opening at the store,
she contacted the defendant's personnel coordinator, Will Hildeburn, who
When she later contacted the
agreed to resubmit her application. 1
personnel coordinator to learn that she had not been selected once again, she
asked him what she could do "to prepare for future openings."' 19 Hildeburn admitted telling her that "there was some concern about your
weight.""° Plaintiff testified that the coordinator actually responded to the
effect that, "'members were concerned that you couldn't physically do the
work due to your weight."""' The personnel coordinator testified, and
'
plaintiff contested, that he also said that the others had more experience. I
Dissatisfied with the response she got, the plaintiff wrote the defendants,
who agreed to meet with her as part of a "'consciousness raising"' session
to discuss her concerns."' At the meeting, Hildeburn apologized to
Cassista for hurting her feelings, and the members of the health food store
discussed their views about weight and job performance. 2 4 One woman,
whose own weight fluctuated, stated that when she was heavier at the end of
the day, "'my feet hurt and my lower back usually hurts, because my
stomach is, you know, pulling my back."'' Another member said that
"when she was pregnant it became more difficult to climb ladders and stock
aisles, and ...that 'physical attributes have to a part of the decision-making

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1145; Cassista 1, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
Cassista 11, 856 P.2d at 1144.
Id.
Id. at 1145.
Cassista 1, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (testimony of personnel coordinator).
Cassista II, 856 P.2d at 1145.
Id.

119. Id.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
856 P.2d at 1145.
Cassista I, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102; Cassista 1I,
Cassista II, 856 P.2d at 1145.
Id. at 1145.
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process.'"' 26 Both of these members, nonetheless, testified that the
plaintiff's weight had no effect on the hiring decision.'27 Hildeburn
admitted to asking a friend shortly before meeting with Cassista, "'If she had
worker and a 150 pound worker, how would she decide who to
a 300-pound
'
pick? ""2
After trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the
defendants. 29 The Court of Appeal reversed, holding, inter alia, that
evidence established that the defendant considered plaintiff's weight to be a
physical disability, as defined by California's Fair Employment and Housing
The California Supreme Court then granted review to
Act (FEHA) .
determine whether the plaintiff had established "a prima facie case" of
'
disability discrimination under FEHA. m
The FEHA regulations defining the term disability since 1980 (but
initially using the term "physical handicap") set forth a definition that almost
exactly tracks the three-prong definition under the Rehabilitation Act and the
The California Supreme Court also looked at the state
ADA.' 32
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1146.
129. Id.
130. Id. The Court of Appeal also ruled that trial court had issued erroneous and prejudicial
jury instructions. Id. The Fair Employment and Housing Act is codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12900 et seq.
131. Cassista II, at 1146.
132. A "handicapped individual" is one who:
1) Has a physical handicap which substantially limits one or more major life time
activities.
2) Has a record of such a physical handicap; or
3) Is regarded as having such a physical handicap.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6, subd. (i) cited in Cassista1I,856 P.2d, at 1149.
Although glossed over by the court, these regulations also provided definitions of the same
three types of perceived disability claims described in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, but
added an expansive fourth category. The regulations define "Regarded as Having a Physical
Handicap" to mean:
1) Has a physical handicap that does not in fact substantially limit one or more major
life activities but is treated by an employer or other covered entity as having a
physical handicap which does substantially limit major life activities; or
2) Has a physical handicap that substantially limits one or more major life activities
only as a result of the attitude of an employer or other covered entity toward such a
physical handicap; or
3) Does not have a physical handicap that substantially limits one or more major life
activities but is treated by an employer or other covered entity as having or having
had a physical handicap that presently substantially limits major life activities; or
4) Does not have a physical handicap that substantially limits one or more major life
activities but is treated by an employer or other covered entity as having an increased
likelihood of developing a physical handicap that substantially limits major life
activities.
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legislature's 1992 Amendment to FEHA for guidance, because the amendment derived from the Rehabilitation Act and ADA, and was therefore
consistent with the 1980 regulations. 3 While unnoted by the court, the
1992 Amendment also declares that any definition of disability in the ADA
that "would result in broader protection" of individuals with a mental or
physical disability or would include any additional medical condition not
included in FEHA's provisions shall be "deemed incorporated" into FEHA
'
and "shall prevail over conflicting provisions." 134
In relevant part, the 1992 Amendment considered by the Court defines
"physical disability" as including, "but not limited to":
(1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following:
A) Affects one or more of the following bodily systems:
neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs,
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary,
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.
B) Limits an individual's ability to participate in major
life activities
(2) Any other impairment described in paragraph (1) that requires
special education or related services.
(3) Being regarded as having had a disease, disorder, condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or heath impairment as
described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) Being regarded as having, or having had, a disease, disorder,
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment that has no present disabling effect but may become a physical
disability as described in paragraph (1) or (2).15
Section (1)(A) appropriates much of the definition of "physical and mental
impairment" set forth in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and restates
prong-one analysis.' 36 Section (3) essentially restates the traditional
"regarded as" prong, and Section (4) adds an expansive point to the definition.

§ 7293.6, subd. (h) (1988).
133. See Cassista II, 856 P.2d at 1149-50 ("The obvious similarity between the 1980
regulation and the 1992 statutory amendment is not coincidental. Both derive from the same
source, the federal Rehabilitation Act .... [and are] modeled, in turn, on the ADA.").
134. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926, subd. (I) (West Supp. 1994).
135. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926, subd. (k), enacted by Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 21.3 No.
6 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, at 3860, cited in Cassista 11, 856 P.2d at 1148. Mental
disabilities are also protected but defined separately under CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926, subd.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2,

(i).
136. Cf. supra notes 18 & 24 and accompanying texts.
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The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal, rejecting
both an actual and perceived disability claim. Because the opinion declared
its finding consistent with "both judicial and administrative interpretations of
federal statutes, 1 37 the court's finding bears on this article's discussion of
the coverage of obesity under the perceived disability claim of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
To succeed with a perceived disability claim, the California Supreme
Court required the plaintiff to show that the defendant perceived her to have
a condition which would satisfy prong one of the definition:
[I]t is not enough to show that an employer's decision is based on the
perception that an applicant is disqualified by his or her weight. The
applicant must also be "regarded as having or having had" a condition
"described in paragraph (1) or (2)," to wit, a physiological disease or
disorder affecting one or more of the bodily systems .... In other words,
the condition, as perceived by the employer, must still be in the nature of
aphysiological3 disorder within the meaning of FEHA, even if it is not in
fact disabling.
However, the court made clear that it understood "physiological disorder"
in the context of obesity to mean that the plaintiff must show evidence that
she has a related physiological disorder (such as heart disease or diabetes) or
that the obesity itself is "caused by systemic or metabolic factors."13
It is problematic to require a plaintiff claiming prong-three coverage in
an obesity case to prove that the employer perceived her obesity to have a
physiological cause. First, since most people discount a physiological basis
for obesity and instead view it as lazy and compulsive behavior, it will be
virtually impossible to prove that the employer viewed the plaintiff's obesity
as having a physiological cause."4 Second, science itself has not been able
to explain the causes of obesity definitely in many cases . 4 The Rehabilitation Act guidelines make clear that the term physical and mental impairment encompasses disorders and conditions "whose precise nature is not at
Consequently, it should not be an absolute requirement
present known."''
137. Cassista 11, 856 P.2d. at 1153.
138. Id. (first emphasis in the original, the rest added).
139. Id. at 1152 (citing the district court's opinion in Cook).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63 (describing the data on this point from
sociological studies).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 164-68 (describing the incomplete scientific data on
the physiological causes of obesity).
142. See supra text accompanying note 25. In asserting that obesity may not be covered
"absent proof of physiological causation under federal law," the court further offered incorrect
"proof" that the EEOC supported this view. The court cited to a provision in the ADA regulations, but truncated it and interpreted it in a manner inconsistent with the EEOC's own position
in Cook. The full provision at issue states, "The definition of the term 'impairment' does not
include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight,
or muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physiological disorder."
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 395 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)) (emphasis added).
Ignoring the conjunction "and," the court cited that the regulations exclude, such physical
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of a perceived disability claim that an employer regarded the plaintiff as
having an impairment explainable by a precise physiological cause.
A more justifiable limitation to a perceived disability claim involving
obesity would be requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer perceived
her to have a physical condition "affecting" one of the "bodily systems." 43
Under the facts of Cassista,this requirement could have been satisfied if the

rationale in Cook were applied. The California Supreme Court could have
found that the defendant, by doubting that Cassista could perform the lifting
tasks required by the job, regarded her condition as affecting her musculoskeletal system." 4 This analysis could explain why the law protects people

with abnormal x-rays but no symptoms of impairment 45 under the perceived disability claim.

The court also incorrectly suggested that voluntariness and immutability
constitute requirements of a disability claim under federal analogs.Y6 In
drawing this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the federal district
court's jury instructions in Cook. 47 These were the same instructions that

the federal appellate court later attacked as flawed. The final ruling in Cook

characteristics as 'height, weight, or muscle tone' that 'are not the result of a physiological
disorder.'" Cassista I, 856 P.2d at 1153. In its brief to the First Circuit in Cook, the EEOC
clarified in a footnote that this provision cannot properly be understood as barring coverage of
obesity: while obesity in some cases may not be '"'the result of a physiological disorder,'" it
is "also not weight within 'normal' range. The Commission's Guidance requires that weight
conditions be the result of a 'physiological disorder' only in situations where the weight falls
within normal range." EEOC br., supra note 6, at 12 n.6. While the California Supreme Court
stated that the EEOC adopted the view that obesity requires proof of physiological causation to
qualify as an impairment, the administration subsequently denounced this interpretation in the
Cook brief.
143. Cf. supra note 24 and accompanying text. The proposed analysis reflects a strict
reading of the third and easiest method of satisfying a perceived disability claim, which requires
showing that the employer has treated the plaintiff as having an impairment, even though the
employee has no such impairment. See supra text accompanying note 23.
By using bum victims as the classic example of the need for third-prong coverage,
Congress made clear that it intended to protect people whose abnormal physical conditions result
in discrimination because of the attitudes of others. See supra notes 29, 32, 34 & 36 and
accompanying text. Because the regulations explicitly include cosmetic disfigurement as an
example of an impairment, see supratext accompanying note 24, the burn victim falls under the
first and second types of perceived disability claims, which address an individual having an
impairment which is substantially limiting only as a result of the attitudes of others.
The concern with the third type of perceived disability claim, which covers people with no
impairment, is that the claim could be too far-reaching. Even if a plaintiffs obesity fails to
qualify as an actual impairment, the plaintiff may still be covered by the third type of perceived
disability claim. In order to address the concern that this claim not be too far-reaching,
requiring a showing that the defendant perceived the condition to have a substantial physical
consequence, i.e., bending walking, etc., or increased health insurance, etc., will limit the scope
of coverage and, at the same time, address Congress' concern that prejudice against abnormal
physical conditions be curtailed.
144. Cf. supra text accompanying note 104.
145. See Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (Rehabilitation Act protects
person excluded from job based on abnormal x-ray which employer treated as a limitation on
lifting capabilities required by the job) and supra text accompanying note 35.
146. See Cassista II, 856 P.2d at 1152-53.
147. Id. at 1152.
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firmly rejected the same suggestion that voluntariness and immutability form
the touchstones of a disability claim.' 48 This aspect of the Cassista
decision should now be understood as overruled, rather than supported, by
the final ruling in Cook.
Hence to the extent that Cassistarelied on the district court's decision
in Cook for a requirement that the employer perceived the plaintiff's obesity
to have a precise physiological cause or that plaintiff's obesity be proven
involuntary or immutable, the First Circuit's final opinion in Cook flatly
rejects such contentions. The California Supreme Court appeared to import
these additional requirement to the perceived disability claim which federal
disability does not, in fact, exact.
III. THE STIGMATIZATION OF OBESITY:

ATTITUDINAL

BARRIERS TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF OBESE PERSONS
ADDRESSED BY THE PERCEIVED DISABILITY CLAIM

This section examines the literature and data from social science studies
to identify more clearly the nature of stereotypes against people who are
obese, and the interplay of these stereotypes with actual discrimination in
employment. The discussion will cover first the general stigmatization of
obesity, then specific work-related stereotypes, and, finally, the documented
existence of employment discrimination against individuals who are fat.
Throughout the discussion, it will be noted how a number of the stereotypes
faced by obese persons constitute precisely the "attitudinal barriers"'' 9 to
employment that the guidelines interpreting the perceived disability claim
proscribe.
As the EEOC regulations clarify, "If an individual can show that an
employer or other covered entity made an employment decision because of
a perception of disability based on 'myth, fear, or stereotype,' the individual
will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the definition of disability."1 50 A
claimant need not show that all employers would apply the same exclusionary
standard,' toward the condition of obesity, or even that the assumptions

148. See supra text accompanying notes 87, 92 & 95-97.
149. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 398 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)).
150. Id.
151. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 398 (1994) (clarifying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.21)) ("An
individual rejected from a job because of the 'myths, fears, and stereotypes' associated with
disabilities would be covered under [the regarded as prong] whether or not the employer's or
other covered entity's perception were shared by others in the field . . . .") (emphasis added);
see also H.R. REP. No. 485 (I), 101st. Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990) ("[w]hether or not the
employer's perception was shared with others in the field," a person rejected from a job because
of myths fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under the perceived
disability claim).
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By highlighting the often widespread assumptions
are necessarily false.'
about obese persons, this discussion hopes to clarify the type of discrimination that an individual plaintiff may have faced from a particular employer,
as well as the different angles of a perceived disability claim that an individual could pursue.
A. General Stigmatization of Obesity
A number of studies have demonstrated the general stigmatization of
obesity, a stigmatization similar to and even stronger than that toward other
disabilities covered under the federal law. One seminal study asked children
and adults to rank, in their order of preference, six drawings depicting
children with a range of disabilities. Subjects consistently ranked them in
this order: 1) a child with no visible disability; 2) a child with crutches and
a leg brace; 3) child sitting in a wheelchair with blanket covering one leg;
4) a child with a missing hand; 5) a child with a facial disfigurement; and 6)
With little exception, 5 4 people responded even more
an obese child.
negatively toward the feature of obesity than toward a facial disfigurement,
a condition that the administrative regulations explicitly cover.'55
The basic finding that adults and children responded more negatively
toward obesity than toward any of the other disabilities shown has been
corroborated by subsequent studies. One later study' 56 found nearly
identical results using a "social distance scale." 157 In that study a number of

152. As noted by a House Judiciary Report, "A person who is covered because of being
regarded as having an impairment is not required to show that the employer's perception is
inaccurate, e.g., that he will be accepted by others, or that insurance rates will not increase in
order to be qualified for the job." H.R. REP. No. 485 (1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990).
showing that the plaintiff is qualified entails showing that he or she is able to perform
Rather,
"essential job functions" with reasonable accommodation. See supra note 77.
153. Norman Goodman, et al., Variant Reactions to Physical Disabilities, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 429, 431-33 (1963).
154. The researchers hypothesized that Jews and Italians of lower socio-economic class,
because of "different cultural practices and values associated with eating," and their often
distinct facial characteristics, would differ in their rankings. Id. at 430-431. Results of the
study found that the Jewish population from low socio-economic status did show greater
preference for the obese child than the dominant group, but the Italian group still ranked the
obese child "conspicuously last." Id. at 432. Both the Italian and Jewish groups showed a
decisive preference for the facially disfigured child over all the other visible disabilities. Id. at
433.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 29 & 32.
156. Victor Matthews & Charles West, A Preferred Method for Obtaining Rankings:
Reactions to PhysicalHandicaps, 31 AM. Soc. REV. 851 (1966).
157. The "social distance" scale used in this scale measured responses to the following seven
points:
1) Would exclude this person form my school.
2) Would be willing to have this type of person in my school.
3) Would be willing to have this type of person in the same club as me.
4) Would be willing to have this type of person as a friend.
5) Would be willing to date or double date with this type of person.
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of the high school students reacted negatively toward the pictorial ranking
method and refused to order the pictures.' Another group of researchers
found that subjects from a public medical clinic, known to include persons
from primarily lower-socioeconomic status, almost consistently ranked the
picture of obesity last. 59 This study, by the Maddox team, additionally
showed that subjects imputed the fat persons to be responsible for their
condition, which intensified the negative reactions.'10
Seizing on the implication in the Maddox study that notions of responsibility affected the negative ratings of people who are obese, William DeJong
conducted experiments showing how subjects evaluated an obese girl less
negatively if they were specifically told that she had a thyroid problem
accounting for the condition. 61 DeJong emphasized that his findings
implied, "Quite simply, the fact obesity is a complicated disorder must be
better communicated." 62 In the absence of a countervailing explanation,
people assume the "naive theory" that the sole causes of obesity are "overeating and lack of exercise," and that understanding does not recognize the
"complex etiology" of the condition.' 63
While the scientific understanding of obesity is not complete, medical
evidence suggests that a range of factors determine obesity, tending to show
that obesity is not a voluntary condition. "Most health professionals agree
that obesity has multiple causes."'"

Studies indicate that the condition of

obesity is linked to genetics, an enzyme in the blood, and in some cases
psychological disorders." One of the most widely accepted theories on
obesity today is the "set point theory," which holds that individuals have a
natural set point for their weight, which the metabolism changes to maintain

6) Would be willing to have this person as my sister or brother.

7) Would be willing to marry or have my sister or brother marry this type of person.
Id. at 852 n.5.
158. Id. at 852 n.6. The results of the students who did rank order the preferences showed

obesity ranked third, although the entire sample ranked obesity last when using the social

distance scale. See id. at 852.

159. See George L. Maddox, Kurt W. Back, & Veronica R. Liederman, Overweight as
Social Deviance and Disability, 9 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 287, 290, 292 (1968).
160. Id. at 295-96; see also id. at 297 (abstract summary).

161. William DeJong, The Stigma of Obesity: The Consequences of Naive Assumptions

Concerning the Causes of PhysicalDeviance, 21 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 75 (1980).

162. Id. at 85.
163. Id.
164. Baker, supra note 9, at 949.
165. See id. at 949-50 for a review of some these studies as of the early 1980s. For recent
findings on the link between genetics and obesity, see, e.g., Pig Research Shows Genetic Link
to Obesity, CHI. TRJB., News Sec., Mar. 28, 1994, at 7; Linda Wasowicz, Scientists Find
Possible Genetic Link to Some Obesity, UPI, Mar. 14, 1994, availablein LEXIS, News Library,
UPI file (A study of people found connection between obesity that begins after puberty and the
D2 dopamine receptor gene, which has been previously linked to alcohol and cocaine abuse.).
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regardless of the amount eaten." 6 While the medical community has not
conclusively determined the causes of obesity, scientific evidence strongly
supports the view that obesity is caused by factors beyond mere overeating.

In fact, a series of studies demonstrated that most people who are obese do
not, in fact, consume more calories than average-weight counterparts.1 6 7
obese people
Furthermore the well-documented inefficacy of dieting for many
1' 68
tends to "rebut the view that all people are fat by choice.'
It should be emphasized that reaching a definitive understanding of
obesity and conclusive link to uncontrollable causes is not a prerequisite to
qualifying for coverage as an actual or perceived disability under federal law.
The regulatory guidelines explicitly cover impairments whose nature is not
presently known. 169 And, as the Cook decision made clear, voluntariness
cannot logically be the touchstone for coverage consistently with other
protected conditions. 170 However, studies showing naive assumptions of
the causes of obesity help explain why people who are obese face discrimination in the first place.
B. Work-Related Stereotypes about Obese Individuals
A number of studies have demonstrated work-related stereotypes about

obese individuals, which have been associated with discriminatory hiring
decisions. This discussion will identify the stereotypes in some depth, in
order to show how their consideration in hiring decisions may match with
clear prohibitions in federal guidelines to disability anti-discrimination laws.
Larkin and Pines conducted one of the leading studies that identified a
"work-related overweight stereotype." 7 ' They ran a two-part experiment.
In the first, subjects were asked to give their impressions of three persons
about whom they only knew weight and sex, with regard to twenty-two

characteristics."

The results showed that:

[O]verweight people are seen as significantly (p<.05) less desirable

employees, who compared with others, are less competent, less productive,
not industrious, disorganized, indecisive, inactive, and less successful....
In addition, on scales measuring the degree to which certain terms and
phrases characterize the target, the descnptive labels conscientious, takes
initiative, aggressive, perseveres at work, and ambitious were seen as less
166. Rothblum, supranote 9, at 11 (citing the theory first posited by R.E. Nisbett, Hunger,

Obesity, and the Ventromedial Hypothalamus, 79 PSYCHOL. REv. 433 (1972)).

167. For a review of these empirical studies, see Rothblum, supra note 9, at 10.
168. Allon, supra note 1, at 161; see also Rothblum, supra note 9, at 12-17 (studies
documenting the inefficacy of dieting).
169. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying texts.
171. Judith Candib Larkin & Harvey A. Pines, No Fat PersonsNeed Apply: Experimental

Studies of the Overweight Stereotype and Hiring Preferences, 6
OCCUPATIONs 312, 313 (1979).

SOCIOLOGY OF

WORK &

172. Id. at 314-15.
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characteristic of the overweight than the average weight, while mentally

lazy and lacks self-discipline were rated as more characteristic of the
overweight. All in all, this picture hardly describes the type of person one

would choose as an employee."

These findings establish, without a doubt, the existence of a "negative
stereotype" toward individuals who are obese."
The authors defined a
"stereotype" as "a pattern of traits we assign to other people, often on the
basis of highly visible and distinctive characteristics, such as race or sex.
Stereotypes are usually simple overgeneralizations that are widely accepted,
but often inaccurate." 1 75
The second part of the Larkin and Pines study showed how in a
simulated personnel selection environment, overweight persons would be
likely to encounter discrimination because of their weight, 176 impliedly
because of those negative stereotypes. Subjects were shown a videotape of
overweight and "normal" persons performing identically on employee
selection tests."7 To control for other variables, the facial gestures and
voices of the employees taking the test were not shown and the obese
applicants were identically dressed; in one of the two tests only the
applicant's hand taking the test was shown. Before showing the tests, the
camera focused only briefly on the applicant, just long enough for the
subjects to observe the applicant's body size. 178 Subjects were told that the
experiment was "'part of a larger research program whose purpose is to
devise different tests that are useful for judging the qualifications of a person
who is applying for a job opening. '"'179 After viewing an applicant's
performance on the employment tests, subjects were asked whether they
would recommend or oppose hiring the applicant for the job requiring skills
measured by those tests, and subjects used a seven-point rating scale to
respond. 8 ' Results of the study showed that the overweight applicants
"were significantly less highly recommended" for hiring than the other
average weight applicants.1 ' Irrespective of equal performance on
qualifying tests, overweight individuals were evaluated more negatively and
less likely to be hired than average weight people. Concern about employers
making such blanket assumptions based on stereotypes rather than individual-

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.at 315-16.
Id.at 317.
Id.at 312.
Id.at 317.
Id.
178. Id.at 317-18.
179. Id.at 319.
180. Id. at 320.
181. Id. at 321. Further suggesting a lower evaluation of the overweight a licant, thinner
subjects, when asked about their chances of being hired compared with the applicant's, showed
a significantly greater expectation of being hired after observing the overweight applicant. Id.
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ized assessments of a person's capabilities gave rise to the federal disability

laws.
The application of disability law is underscored by the fact that obese
people are assumed to be in poor health and have a high mortality rate.
"The association between excess mortality and overweight is a particularly

pronounced with regard to cardio-vascular-renal diseases, diabetes mellitus,
and diseases of the digestive system. These findings have been popularized

by the mass media and disseminated by way of mouth in such a pervasive

way."))18

The poor health stereotype bears significance on employment decisions
because it often translates into assumptions of higher absenteeism, increased
insurance rates, and greater workers' compensation costs. Misguidedly,
some commentators have argued that those factors justify an employer in
discriminating against people who are obese." To the contrary, employers are specificallyprohibitedfrom taking those concerns into account under
the EEOC guidelines to the ADA." 8 The stereotype of health risks also
distinguishes obesity discrimination from mere "appearance-based" discrimination, placing obesity discrimination directly within the scope of protection
of disability law.'1 Plaintiffs may also be able to use specific evidence
that these health-related stereotypes influence their employer's decision in

182. Werner J. Cahnman, The Stigma of Obesity, 9 Soc. Q. 283, 284-85 (1968).
183. See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 576 (arguing that "Employer's have a right to consider
higher medical insurance rates, life insurance rates, workers' compensation, death benefits, sick
leave, turnover, higher absenteeism rates, and higher mortality rates in considering which
employees to hire."); cf Bierman, supra note 39, at 969 (arguing that while obesity should be
protected through new legislation paralleling equal protection law, it should not be covered
under federal disability law because, "More likely, an employer would view an obese person
as an above-average user of various insurance programs, rather than as a handicapped
employee.").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. As further illustration, a House Judiciary
Report explained the reasons that people with abnormal x-rays but no symptoms would be
protected under the "regarded as" prong:
[Many people are rejected from jobs because a back x-ray reveals some anomaly
even though the person has no symptoms of a back impairment. The reasons for the
rejection are often fear of injury, as well as increased insurance or worker's
compensation costs. These reasons for rejection rely on common barriers to
employment for persons with disabilities and therefore, the person is perceived to be
disabled under the third test.
H.R. 485, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1990).
To the extent that one court sanctions
discrimination against people whom employers assume have a potential for high absenteeism and
low productivity because of their obesity, the holding plainly violates the ADA. Cf. Philadelphia
Electric Co. v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Human Relations Com., 448 A.2d 701, 708 (Pa.
1982).
185. Cf. Shapiro, supranote 39, at 576 (noting that discrimination against the obese is based
on appearance, which is permitted by federal law and most state law); Note, FacialDiscrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical
Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (1987) (arguing the Rehabilitation Act should be used
to protect against discrimination based on appearance, including obesity, shortness, and
unattractive facial characteristics).
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order to support a claim that the employer regarded obesity as a physical
impairment affecting their bodily systems.' 86
The current association of obesity with poor health and mortality has an
interesting historical origin. The negative stereotype began as a result of
"the persistent claim advanced by insurance companies that obesity is a
morbid condition, which a responsible person concerned about his health
should avoid."'" An influential statistician and employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Louis Dublin, wrote in popular and medical
journals during the first half of the 20th century about the risk of obesity,
naming it "'America's No. One Health Problem."" 88 At the same time
that life insurance companies proliferated these health concerns, slimness
became associated with standards of beauty in the United States, as reflected
in cultural icons like the flat, adolescent bodies of flappers in the 1910s and
1920s to the 97-pound model Twiggy in the 1960s. 89
Challenging the accuracy of the assumption that obesity causes health
problems, modem research shows that is actually the effect of the diet cycle
on the body, not extra pounds, that leads to health problems like increased
heart disease and hyper-tension. 19° Studies conclusively demonstrated that
repeated dieting causes hypertension, heart disease, and shortened lives in
mice, swine, and rats.' 9 ' Studies of obese dieters versus nondieters showed
abnormal levels of free fatty acids only among the dieters. 92 Weight loss
diets, independent of weight regain and subsequent diets, have also been
linked to a variety of physical problems, such as gallstones, anemia, and
cardiac disorders. 93 These findings seriously defeat the paternalistic
assumption that people who are obese should be encouraged to lose weight
for their
own good and therefore should not be protected under disability
194
law.
186. In Cook, the court reached this conclusion in determining that the defendant's admitted
fear of plaintiff's increased risk of heart attack and worker's compensation claims amounted to
treating her as if her condition affected her cardiovascular system. Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept
of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 1993). See supra note
104 and accompanying text.
187. Maddox, supra note 159, at 288.
188. Rothblum, supra note 9, at 6 (citing W. BENNETT & J. GURIN, THE DIETER'S

DILEMMA 133 (1982)).

189. Id. (citing R. FREEDMAN, BEAUTY BOUND 149 (1986)).
190. Id. at 18-19 (survey of supporting studies); Allon, supra note 1, at 162 (discussion of
additional studies).
191. Id. (citing, e.g., P. Ernsberger, The Death of Dieting, AM. HEALTH 4, 29-33 (1985)).
192. Id. at 18 (citing J.A. Hibescher & C.P. Herman, Obesity, Dieting, and the Expression
of 'Obese' Characteristics,2 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. PSYCHOL. 374 (1970)).
193. Id. (citing J. PoLIVY & C.P. HERMAN, BREAKING THE DIET HABIT (1983) for a review
of those studies).
194. This paternalistic assumption underlies the decisions in Missouri Comm'n on Human
Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mp. App. 1985) (plaintiff should
not receive "benefit" of protection under disability law for her obesity and high blood pressure
because she took "no steps to treat and control" her condition) and Greene v. Union Pac R,R.
Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (morbid obesity not protected because it is not an
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C. Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination
In addition to the findings by Larkin and Pines of discrimination against
obese persons in a simulated hiring environment, strong documentation exists
showing that actual discrimination in employment occurs. 195 The Maryland
Commission on Human Relations conducted one of the most extensive
studies, finding "the obese are penalized by lower pay, inequitable hiring
standards, relegation to noncontact public positions, and other distinctive
treatment, based on non-job related criteria."' 196 In fact, the study concluded that the population of fat people may well face greater discrimination than

an African American."9 Similarly, a widely reported study by an employment agency, the Robert Half Association, found that overweight workers
made significantly less money and were less likely to get higher positions
when promotions came around.19 Recent studies focusing on women show
a significant adverse impact of obesity on their earning power. 199
Studies also show a correlation between obesity and high unemployment
rates.'
The unemployment resulting from discrimination against fat
people indicates a high cost to society as a whole, because of lost productivi-

immutable condition).
195. For a more detailed discussion, see Baker, supra note 9, at 952-54 (1982); Allon, supra
note 1, at 137-40.
Discrimination against obese persons existing in areas other than employment has been
documented as well. See, e.g., Lambros Karris, PrejudiceAgainst Obese Rentors, 101 J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 101, 159-60 (1977) (landlords less likely to rent to obese people); H. Canning & J.
Mayer, Obesity- Its Possible Effect on College Acceptance, 275 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1172
(1966) cited in Allon, supra note 1, at 36-137 (bias in college admissions).
196. STATE OF MD COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, REP. ON THE STUDY OF WEIGHT
SIZE DISCRIMINATION, Executive Summary, (1979) [hereinafter MD COMM'N STUDY].

AND

197. Id. at 49 (citing an employment agent manger who commented that, "'It is much easier
to place a Black person on the job than someone who is fat,'" and concluding that much of the
research in this study "indicate[s] that there is a great deal of substance in that statement").
198. FatterExecutives Get Slimmer Pay Checks, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 14, 1974, at 21, cited
in Allon, supra note 1, at 39 & MD COMM'N STUDY, supra note 196, at 39.
199. One study, which followed 10,039 young adults for seven years, found that overweight
women earned $6,710 a year less and were 10% more likely to have income below the poverty
level; while overweight men also earned less than their average weight counterparts, the earning
difference proved far less dramatic than for women. Conducted by researchers from the
Harvard School of Public and Health and the New England Medical Center, the study's results
became published in the New England Journal of Medicine. See Gina Kolata, Women Pay Price
for Being Obese, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A18.
Another study, conducted exclusively on women, used data from a large aerospace
organization and found that "weight is a predictor of occupation and income," but that the effect
on income was "significant only for women in professional, technical, and management
positions." See Katherine M. Haskins, The Relationship Between Weight and Career Payoffs
Among Women (1989) in 50 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL 3743-A. (May 1990).
200. See, e.g., Daphne A. Roe & Kathleen Eickwort, Relationships Between Obesity and
Associated Health Factors with Unemployment Among Low Income Women, 31 J. AM. MED.
WOMEN'S Assoc. 193 (1976); MD COMM'N STUDY, supra note 196, at 41-49 (interviews with
employment agencies).
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ty and the increased need for welfare services." In a New York-based
study, researchers found through questionnaires to employers that 15.9 % said
that they would not hire obese women; and 43.9% considered obesity to be
conditional medical grounds for refusal to hire.'
Altogether, these
findings reveal that employment discrimination against the obese poses more
than a theoretical matter. It is a very real, and, evidence suggests, widespread phenomenon.
CONCLUSION

Obesity discrimination, which is based on stereotypes associated with a
physical condition, subverts the principle behind federal disability law and
anti-discrimination doctrine as a whole.' Specific features of obesity and
common reactions to the condition make it especially suited for protection
under a perceived disability theory. Unfortunately, much of society harbors
negative stereotypes toward obesity, which directly affects the employment
prospects of fat people. Employment discrimination against obese people
based on stereotypes-including the beliefs that they are automatically less
productive, prone to health problems, inclined to higher absenteeism, and
likely to raise insurance and workers compensation costs-amounts to the
very type of attitudinal barrier toward disabilities that the perceived disability
claim reaches. While obesity in some cases may constitute a cognizable
"physical or mental impairment," the third type of the perceived disability
claim does not hinge on such determination. The Cook decision sets forth
a valuable precedent for using the perceived disability claim to combat
obesity discrimination, and the decision proves overall consistent with the
purposes and parameters of the federal disability laws.

201. For example, a particular supervisor's attitude toward the obesity of a highly rated
office manager, Joseph Gimello, caused him to be passed over for promotion and then
discharged; consequently he had to sell an antique car in his family's possession and ended up

on welfare for a period. See Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 26768, 271 (N.J. Super. 1991).

202. Roe & Eickwort, supra note 200, at 199 cited in Allon, supra note 1, at 137-38 &
Baker, supra note 9, at 954.
203. Cf. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 218 (1992) ("Discrimination
may be intrinsically wrong because it is based upon biases, the incorrect judgments of lesser
moral worth, or upon the shallow aversions or inaccurate negative stereotypes that are produced
by such judgments.").
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